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Abstract 
 
 During the past decade there has been a proliferation of sports stadia being 
built in America’s municipal districts. While it used to be common for the public 
to fully fund stadium construction projects, over the past twenty years factors 
such as political motives, tax reform and increased public awareness of tax equity 
have forced sports teams to share increasing amounts of the financial burden 
(Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003).  As public funding for stadia construction has 
decreased, franchises have continued to strive for maximized profits. 
Concurrently, the cost of attending events in sports stadia has increased for 
consumers in terms of higher ticket prices even though changes in fixed costs 
should not affect pricing (Leeds & von Allmen, 2004). 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the use 
of public funds to build stadia and the profit maximizing goals of National 
Football League (NFL) franchises.  A hypothesis was formulated that stated the 
impact of the public share of the construction cost would have no effect on 
relative ticket prices for those that consume the product.  The cross-sectional data 
for a ticket price model, which consisted of seasonal data from every NFL team to 
play from 1991 through 2003, was investigated.  The results showed an increase 
in public funding by 10% lowers ticket prices by 42 cents.  As shown, the bulk of 
the variation in ticket prices was due to a general increase over time and MSA per 
capita income. 
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The use of Public Funds for Private Benefit: 
An Examination of the Relationship between Public Stadium Funding and Ticket 
Prices in the National Football League 
During the past decade there has been a proliferation of new sports stadia 
in America’s municipal districts. While it used to be common for the public to 
fully fund stadium construction projects, over the past twenty years political 
motives, tax reform and increased public awareness of tax equity have forced 
sports teams to share increasing amounts of the financial burden to construct 
stadia and arenas (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003). Yet despite these factors, 
public money still continues to support approximately 55% of stadium costs 
(Broughton, 2004). Even when these public funds were used, sport franchises, 
like most private sector firms, have focused on maximizing shareholder wealth as 
they strive for maximized profits. 
Several forms of public subsidy have been used in the construction of 
stadia and arenas, from the use of public funds (tax dollars) to build stadia and 
arenas to the reduction or elimination of property taxes on privately owned 
facilities.  Fort (2004b), in his paper Subsidies as Incentive Mechanisms in Sports, 
examined the relationship between public subsidies and ticket prices.  Here, 
operating subsidies were examined.  Fort found that an inverse relationship 
existed between stadium operating subsidies and ticket pricing in single-use 
stadia.   
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In his article, Fort (2004b) divided subsidies into two categories: 
construction subsidies and operating subsidies.  He stated that construction 
subsidies included both direct and indirect tax and infrastructure subsidies while 
operating subsidies included subsidies granted to team owners in stadium lease 
agreements.  In this current paper, the subsidy examined was the use of public 
funds, a tax subsidy, to build new venues.  This would be classified by Fort as a 
construction based subsidy. 
Factors Influencing the Use of Public Funds for Sport Venues 
Political Motives 
Legislators, like politicians at every level, run according to agendas, most 
of which are determined in the election process. According to Brunori (2001), 
ambition has guided the motives of state legislators.  Once in office, these 
legislators have focused on reelection, attempted to enhance their political reach, 
and hoped to further their political careers.  It can therefore be assumed that 
legislators will work hard to advance their agendas, a notion supported by 
Brunori.  With regard to tax policy, the author noted that policy is formulated to 
advance both public policy and political goals.  If these goals have the potential to 
enhance a legislator’s standing with an important special interest group, public 
policy and political goals have often intersected.   
One potential interest, the sport team owner, has become powerful within 
local political and business communities. Some politicians have utilized this 
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power during elections, and upon taking office seek support for the public funding 
of sports stadia (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003). The most common public 
mechanism to raise the capital needed to fund a stadium has been the sales tax, 
presumably because of its obscurity.  This source of funding has been used 
because politicians attempt to obscure an individual’s tax burden by passing 
increases in taxes that are mostly unnoticed by their constituents (Brunori, 2001).  
As such, the author noted that the sales tax is the easiest form of tax to hide.  The 
sales tax is paid in such small increments that the public is largely unaware of its 
gross sales tax liability.  
As increases are frequently so small that the cost of fighting them is too 
much for an individual person or group to bear, sales tax increases have often 
received little resistance from the public.  Thomas R. Dye, in his theory on public 
taxation acceptance, posed that special interests look for the benefits, subsidies, 
and privileges government can provide with the costs of these benefits, subsidies, 
and privileges being born by all taxpayers.  As these costs are dispersed to a large 
number of individuals, it was stated that very few feel that the added tax is worth 
the time or money to oppose the benefit, subsidy or privilege granted to the 
special interest (Brown & Paul, 1999). 
Occasionally, taxpayers have joined together to oppose a benefit for a 
special interest.  In Hamilton County, Ohio, taxpayers fought a sales tax increase 
designed to fund two new sports venues along Cincinnati’s riverfront. The two 
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stadia were funded through the use of a sales tax, thus assuring that the costs of 
building the stadia would be spread over as large a population as possible.  To 
counter opposition to the sales tax increase, the sales tax increase was combined 
with a property tax rollback; therefore, for property owners only, there was a net 
tax reduction (Brown & Paul, 1999).  The Hamilton County sales tax increase was 
so marginal to the millions affected; few had the inclination, time, or resources to 
fight it politically. 
 Additionally, politicians are forced to make decisions concerning where 
tax revenue is spent. Often if they chose to use tax revenue to fund one project, 
resources were taken away from other projects. This has been referred to as 
opportunity cost. Crompton, Howard, and Var (2003) defined opportunity costs in 
sport as benefits that would be received if public resources committed to a 
sporting facility were redirected for other use.  Within the political process, 
however, opportunity costs have been often ignored when determining where 
funds are spent.    
 To understand the concept of opportunity costs in public administration, 
Crompton, Howard, and Var (2003) discussed the differences between capital and 
operating budgets.  Importantly, funds from capital and operating budgets cannot 
be directly substituted.  Those that advocate additional funds for education, public 
safety, and public health rather than funds for a sporting venue look to a city’s 
operating budget for increased support.  To solve the fiscal problems for the social 
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programs listed above, permanent acceptance of higher tax rates has been 
required.  It has usually been easier to convince voters to support increases in 
taxes for capital projects, such as stadia, where tax increases are almost always 
temporary.  Further as operating budgets are not approved by a public vote, 
resulting tax changes will be linked to those in office at the time of election. 
Operating budgets also increase incrementally, and thus are on-going and likely to 
increase. Capital investments, however, have a fixed time frame determined by a 
bond’s maturity. 
 The differences between operating and capital budgets have explained 
some of the political incentives for advocating stadium funding. In addition, as 
Crompton, Howard, and Var (2003) stated, public subsidies for sport venues 
frequently come from non-residents (hotel/motel tax, car rental tax) while items in 
operating budgets are funded primarily from the community taxpayer.  As 
politicians are driven by results and constituents can visually see the impact of 
stadium construction, the physical improvements can be equated as progress. For 
social programs, it has been much harder to measure progress by pointing to 
tangible results; therefore, progress in these areas often has been overlooked.  
 Even though political motives can drive the push for increased public 
funding in capital projects, the use of tax revenue must still be justified. 
According to Crompton, Howard, and Var (2003), these capital expenditures must 
show a positive return on investment.  Additionally, the investment in the capital 
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project must return an amount at least equal to other capital projects in which the 
government could have invested.  Therefore, if a municipality decided to fund a 
sports stadium it needed to be able to justify the benefits of such a project. Baade 
(1996) stated decisions to subsidize a sports stadium force either delays or 
reductions in other needed capital projects, or force a community to increase their 
total tax burden to support all needed projects. 
Tax Reform 
Despite the prowess of many politicians, stadium tax levies have faced 
increasing resistance from the public. According to Baade and Dye (1990), 
operating deficits in publicly owned, or financed, stadia have led to taxpayer 
resistance in communities proposing new funding for new sporting venues.  In 
San Francisco, the citizens have voted down a number of proposals that would 
have created public funding mechanisms for new stadia to be used by the San 
Francisco Giants (baseball) and 49ers (football).   
In addition to the faltering financial status of existing stadiums, tax reform 
has added to the external pressures facing public budgeters. In Dubuque, Iowa, 
voters resoundingly voted down a stadium bond issue that would have been used 
to partially fund the construction of a new baseball facility (Stiles, 2004). In 
Minnesota, the Saint Paul City Council voted 4-2 to reject a public funding 
proposal to build a ballpark and attract the Twins (baseball) out of Minneapolis 
(Associated Press, 2004). 
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 The two tax reforms that have affected the public funding of sport venues 
both were passed during the Reagan administration.  The first, the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 ended the use of tax-exempt bonds to finance luxury 
boxes, and the second, the Tax-Reform Act of 1986, prohibited the use of tax-
exempt bonds for sports facilities if more than 10 percent of its revenue came 
from one tenant.  With the elimination of their tax exemption, the cost of 
financing stadia through the offering of bonds increased; therefore, municipalities 
were forced to find other means to help defer the cost.  At the same time, 
municipalities increased the use of ‘load shedding,’ where costs were shifted from 
the public sector and absorbed by private entities (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 
2003). As a result, many sports teams now had to incur a portion of the cost of 
constructing new facilities.  Though public/private funding partnerships began to 
appear with some regularity, most stadium projects consisted of sport franchises 
contributing a substantial, but minority, share of the facility’s cost.  This shared 
cost approach was more widely accepted by the public and helped politicians 
continue to accommodate sport franchises. 
Equity in Taxation 
 Inherently, taxation has been viewed negatively by the public as it reduces 
personal income. However, taxation has been necessary in modern society. The 
primary issue in taxation has not been the tax itself, but the fairness of the tax.  
According to Mikesell (2002), tax policy has been formulated to cause the least 
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amount of economic harm as taxes move available resources from private use, 
thereby harming the private sector.  Therefore, a socially acceptable tax would 
collect as much revenue as possible for government operations while leaving 
ample resources for private sector use.  
 When evaluating tax policy, equity has been the major thrust. Mikesell 
(2002) stated that there were two general standards of equity.  The first was 
benefits received.  Taxpayers have examined tax equity based upon the direct 
benefits from, or usage of, the public service funded via the tax.  The second 
standard of equity was the ability to pay.  Here, the author stated the taxpayer 
evaluates equity based upon his or her ability to bear the burden of the tax.  For 
example, when examining a tax on gasoline, the benefits received approach to 
evaluating equity could be used.  The purchaser of the gasoline would determine 
the level of taxation by the amount gasoline he or she consumed and then relate 
the taxation amount to road improvements, a public service funded by the 
gasoline tax.  The tax would be evaluated based upon the perception of the 
benefits received.  Using the ability to pay approach, the purchaser evaluated the 
tax based upon the perceived amount of tax burden he or she felt that he or she 
could pay.  
 The benefits based approach has been criticized however.  Mikesell (2002) 
stated that today’s governments have attempted to redistribute wealth when 
providing social services.  Services have been provided which transfer (net) 
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income from one group to another.  Here the benefits received approach has failed 
as the objective of taxation is subsidization rather than exchange.  Although 
impractical in some situations, the ability to pay method has had wider appeal. As 
Mikesell described, the market-exchange philosophy can be found in this 
approach as, regardless of service, those capable of bearing the costs of 
government should bear the greatest amount of those costs. 
 Mikesell (2002) described two additional forms of equity that have been 
used to further evaluate methods of taxation. Horizontal and vertical equity have 
been commonly used standards to measure the fairness of a tax across and within 
social segments. Horizontal equity, or the equal treatment of taxpayers with the 
same capability to pay taxes, has been supported in the Supreme Court in regard 
to property taxes.  Further, the court’s ruling has been extended to similar forms 
of taxation. When applying the concept of vertical equity, the relationship 
between the taxes paid by individuals with different abilities to pay is examined.  
Importantly, vertical equity measures the association between effective rates of 
taxation and income. 
 Taxation equity has been an issue in sport stadia financing on two 
accounts. The first was the vertical equity of the tax and the second was the equity 
of tax revenue allocation. According to Crompton, Howard and Var (2003), when 
examining public resources, one must examine who gets the resources, and even 
who should get the resources.  In the public funding of stadia, taxpayer’s dollars 
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have been used to pay for the construction of stadia that primarily house sports 
franchises owned by millionaires.  Therefore, the public has transferred income 
from the community to a small group of wealthy owners.  Further, if not to 
enhance the inequity of the relationship, sports franchises charged consumers to 
watch games despite receiving a substantial public subsidy.     
 The issue of inequity in the funding of public stadia has been hotly 
debated. While municipalities have attempted to justify funding stadiums using 
the economic development argument, many have questioned the true value of 
professional sports as a public good.  Regardless of the argument, without these 
subsidies, the prevalent but inequitable practice of transferring resources from the 
ordinary taxpayer to the wealthy owner would end.  However, the inequity of 
resource allocation would continue as long as the public funds any form of capital 
project, whether sport related or not. While some cases may be more blatant than 
others, sports stadia typically have garnered greater exposure and thus public 
funding for such projects has been easier to scrutinize. 
 As discussed earlier, the original sales tax in Hamilton County, Ohio 
increased by one percentage point in the county; however, the final proposed tax 
was reduced when a property tax break was included in the ballot initiative. As 
reported by Brown and Paul (1999), the final proposal ended with 70% of the tax 
revenue being used to fund new stadia for the Reds (baseball) and Bengals 
(football) and 30% being used to offset the reduction in local property taxes. This 
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tax proved, however, to be vertically inequitable given the large proportion of 
renters within the county. 
 Though passed by the community, the Hamilton County tax proposal 
failed the vertical equity test by providing greater net tax relief to higher income 
earners primarily based on their home ownership. According to Brown and Paul 
(1999), homeowners earning over $45,000 received a net tax reduction.  Those 
earning less than $27,000 had a net tax increase.  Finally, homeowners earning 
between $27,000 and $45,000 broke even when the effects of the two tax changes 
were combined.  As the authors noted, there was a clear disparity between the 
level of tax paid by lower income earners and the proportion paid by higher 
income earners, and this disparity was vertically inequitable. Michaud, a 
Cincinnati news writer, was quoted by Brown and Paul and stated that the plan 
was “a transfer of wealth from the poor to higher income groups … we are in fact 
taking money from the little guy … and transferring it to the millionaires” (p. 
227). 
Expenditure of Public Funds and Profit Maximization 
While the factors that ultimately affect public funding decisions are 
debated and tax equity is measured, the owners of sport organizations may view 
the operation of their clubs as similar to the operation of other businesses and seek 
financial gains, such as shareholder wealth maximization (Foster, Greyser, & 
Walsh, 2006). In the case of a private business like a sport franchise, the 
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shareholders are company ownership. Essentially, the concept of profit 
maximization has referred to increasing the profit transferred to ownership. These 
goals have been widely accepted by the business community and have been the 
aim of most for-profit organizations. The sports industry has been no different, in 
that team owners have attempted to maximize a combination of their personal 
wealth and some aspect of winning (Brown & Paul, 1999). Naturally, implications 
have arisen from this.  
When outside forces, such as tax increases or increases in stadium 
construction cost, pressure a business, ownership has attempted to maximize its 
wealth by shedding the burden of these new expenses onto other elements of the 
company. This process has been characterized in business by a concept called 
shifting.  Mikesell (2002) stated that there were three ways a business may 
respond.  First, in forward shifting, a business will respond by increasing its prices 
to reflect the new expense.  Or, a business might backward shift.  Here a business 
will reduce the price paid to the owners of the resources it purchases.  It may also 
reduce the wages paid to employees and the prices paid for raw materials.  
Finally, a business might absorb the cost thereby returning a lower profit to its 
shareholders.  As most businesses utilize the profit-maximizing model, the effect 
of increased taxes or increased capital expenditures has been to shift the increased 
financial burden to the consumer or employee. Tax decreases or a decrease in 
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capital expenditure, however, have been absorbed by shareholders in the form of 
increased profits or dividends1. 
Based upon economic theory, however, there should be no connection 
between increased or decreased capital expenditures and costs to consumers.  
Therefore, there should be no relationship between fixed cost, the cost of 
constructing a new stadium, and marginal cost, the cost of selling one more seat to 
the game (Leeds & von Allmen, 2004).  Stadium subsidies reduce an 
organization’s fixed costs.  But, stadium subsidies do not impact the marginal 
costs of increasing attendance or revenues.  As marginal costs are not affected, 
there is no incentive for a profit maximizing organization to either lower price if 
stadium subsidies are increased or raise price if stadium subsidies are decreased. 
 Current public stadium financing trends have seen sport owners accept a 
greater burden of the construction and operational costs. Regardless of whether or 
not the stadium capital investment was funded totally or partially by an 
incremental tax covering millions of people, in the end the profit maximizing 
company will act in one of two ways.  First, according to Mikesell (2002), it may 
shift as much of its own cost upon its customers, employees, and suppliers.  
Crompton, Howard and Var (2003) added that teams without public funding have 
to compensate by utilizing more of their revenue to repay annual facility debt 
                                                 
1 The profit-maximizing incentive to pass on costs in the form of higher prices depends on whether 
the costs are fixed or variable.  The ability to pass on costs also depends on the elasticities of both 
supply and demand. 
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load.  Second, there may be no impact on pricing as economic theory dictates that 
changes in fixed costs should not affect pricing (Leeds & van Allmen, 2004).  The 
purpose of this study was to explore this process in the National Football League 
(NFL) by examining the effect on consumer prices.  A hypothesis was formulated 
that stated the impact of the public share of the construction cost would have no 
effect on relative ticket prices for those that consume the product. 
Data 
A cross-sectional and time series ticket price model was used in this study 
to test the hypothesis.  The data used in the model consisted of seasonal data from 
every NFL team that played from 1991 through 2003. Included in these data was 
information regarding each NFL stadium, and variables that may describe 
fluctuations in ticket pricing (see Table 1). In total there were 19 potential 
explanatory variables that were determined by the review of literature. Team 
Marketing Report published pricing information on a yearly basis, and for the 
purpose of this research, was the most reliable source for pricing data 
(www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm, 2004). 
________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 
about here 
_______________________________ 
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In order to develop an applicable model for NFL ticket pricing, it was 
important to include the population and per capita income of the market for each 
team. To achieve this, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data were used. This 
data was taken from US Census estimates. NFL teams likely draw fans from the 
city in which they play and from the surrounding communities. Therefore, MSA 
data had the potential to provide the most applicable forecast of population (MSA 
Population) as well as income variables (MSA Per Capita Income). According to 
Rascher (1999), studies found income to be a significant factor in determining 
attendance at sporting events. The expected effect of increases in MSA population 
and per capita income was an increase in the cost of an NFL ticket.  Further, the 
model utilized a dummy variable to denote those NFL teams that share MSAs.  
The model also utilized two dummy variables, Expansion Year and Relocation 
Year, to control for trends related to franchise movement.  The model took the 
following form: 
 
NFL Average Ticket Prices = f(season, capacity, public share, stadium age, MSA 
income, average of lagged wins and current winning percent) 
 
Team Marketing Report’s Fan Cost Index™ (FCI), a vector of prices that 
fans pay to attend sporting events, included two adult average price tickets, two 
child average price tickets, four small soft drinks, two small beers, four hot dogs, 
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two programs, parking, and two adult sized caps. The first law of demand 
predicted that higher prices will lead to lower levels of demand, ceteris paribus.  
The average Fan Cost Index for attending one game was $229.60 for the sample, 
with a low of $124.68 and a high of $438.59. 
Winning percentage (Season Winning %) was expected to be an important 
proxy for the quality of the home team.  The winning percentage in the year each 
season began, seasons 1991 to 2003, was used.  There were a number of studies 
that found winning to be an important determinant of attendance demand 
(Burdekin & Idson, 1991; McDonald & Rascher, 2000). Further, Martell and 
Tehranian (1988) found that winning percentage impacted the cost of a scalped 
ticket. As expected, the average winning percentage was near 0.5002 (at 0.501), 
with the minimum at 0.063 and the maximum at 0.938.   
Lagged winning percentage (Lagged Winning %) was also expected to 
affect demand because the previous season’s performance affected season ticket 
sales and the appeal of early season games.  For instance, Rascher (1999) showed 
that in baseball an extra win by the home team in the previous season increased 
per game attendance by about 450 fans for the first half of the season, but 
declined in magnitude, to 150 fans per game, and in significance, for the second 
half of the season. 
                                                 
2 For the last four seasons of the data set, there were an odd number of teams in the NFL.  
Winning percentage will not exactly equal .500 due to ties that are a possible outcome of a game 
in a league with an odd number of teams. 
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There were factors unrelated to the game itself that could also act as 
forecasting tools such as those associated with stadia. There was a presumed 
difference in ticket prices associated with the level of public funding provided for 
the construction of a stadium. Thus, the level of public funding (Public Funding 
%) and the level of private funding (Private Funding %) for each stadium was 
incorporated into the study. The average level of public funding support was 
84.94 percent with a minimum value of zero percent and a maximum value of 100 
percent.  
There was also a presumed effect of stadium age upon the desirability of 
attending an event (McEvoy, Nagel, DeSchriver, & Brown, 2005). As a result 
stadium age (Stadium Age) was included in the model.  Finally, instead of 
utilizing attendance as a factor, percent capacity (Percent Capacity Sold) was 
deemed a more appropriate measure as it allowed for meaningful comparison 
between teams.  Capacity (Stadium Capacity) was used as well as overall supply 
was fixed and unchangeable. 
Analysis and Results 
A ticket-pricing model was developed to test the hypothesis that the 
impact of the public share of the construction cost would have no effect on 
relative ticket prices for those that consume the product.  Typically, simultaneity 
problems exist when trying to estimate models of prices because price is 
simultaneously determined by supply and demand.  However, in this case supply 
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was fixed and unchangeable.  An owner cannot change the capacity of the 
stadium or the number of games played.  In fact, the many articles that estimate 
attendance relied on this notion when introducing ticket price into the 
econometric models.  These issues are discussed in Fort (2004a).  Only if teams 
provide prices by number of seats available at each price point and tickets sold at 
each price point will there be a better method of estimation. 
In addition to ticket price, the full cost of attendance should be analyzed.  
However, there is no data on the full cost of attendance other than what is 
estimated by a team’s FCI.  There is no reason to believe that travel costs (and 
other costs) vary across teams in any systematic manner or vary according to the 
source of stadium financing.  Thus, these effects will be captured in the intercept 
term. 
As described in the previous section, there were a number of variables 
shown in previous studies to have an effect on ticket price.  In this study, the time 
trend was shown to have a great impact on average ticket price.  Based on the 
results shown in Table 2, average ticket prices increased $2.07, or about 5%, each 
additional season when starting at the average ticket price.  As predicted, the 
quality of the team during the previous season affected expected demand, and 
lagged winning percentage was very significant.  However, season winning 
percentage was not significant. Different specifications of season winning 
percentage and lagged winning percentage were tested, with season winning 
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percentage never being significant.  By averaging season winning percentage with 
lagged winning percentage, the F-statistic of the overall model improved (as 
compared to the model with just lagged winning percentage), even though the t-
statistic on the average of season and lagged winning percentage was less than on 
lagged winning percentage alone. A 10 percentage point increase in the average 
of lagged and season winning percentage was associated with a rise in average 
ticket prices of 1%, or $0.63 on average. 
________________________________ 
Insert Table 2 
about here 
_______________________________ 
Older stadiums had lower ticket prices.  While statistically significant, the 
economic importance is minimal.  For each year older, average ticket prices were 
about $0.05 lower.  Additionally, wealthier MSAs had higher ticket prices.  For 
every $10,000 increase in MSA per capita income3, average ticket prices were 
approximately $3.64 higher, ceteris paribus. 
In determining if the impact of the public share of the construction cost 
would not affect relative ticket prices for consumers of the NFL product, the 
results proved that the hypothesis was incorrect.  An increase in public funding by 
                                                 
3 In a comparison of F-statistics, it is better to have MSA income instead of MSA population. 
Using wealth (MSA population*MSA income) has a lower F-statistic and R2 in general.  
Therefore, it is not a solution to collinearity. 
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10% lowered the average ticket price by approximately $0.42 cents.  As shown, 
the majority of the variation in average ticket price was due to a general increase 
over time and MSA per capita income.  Further, the negative relationship between 
ticket price and the percentage of the stadium that was publicly financed was 
masking the negative relationship between public financing and season.  Over the 
past decade-and-a-half, ticket prices rose and the percentage of public financing 
declined, but most of the ticket price increase was accounted for by simple 
increases in demand and inflation, as well as MSA per capita income. 
Finally, the analysis corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s robust 
errors.  The Ramsey RESET test showed no omitted variable bias, and the 
Shapiro-Wilk test showed that each variable was normally distributed at the less 
than 3% level.  A variance inflation factor analysis caused the removal of a few 
collinear variables (Lagged Playoff Appearance, Lagged Super Bowl Win, 
Lagged Super Bowl Appearance). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 The findings did not support the hypothesis that higher percentages of 
public stadium funding would have no impact on ticket prices.  However, the 
findings add to Fort’s (2004b) study on subsidies as both have found that an 
inverse relationship exists between ticket price and subsidy, whether operating or 
construction.   
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It must be noted that the impact of public funding of stadia on the average 
ticket price of a team was small.  Average ticket prices have been increasing 
seasonally, regardless of the composition of stadium funding. Given that the 
average NFL stadium was almost 90 percent full for every game, team owners 
have been able to increase the price of tickets without significant negative impacts 
on attendance. Therefore it can be assumed that ticket price increases reflect an 
increase in the fan’s willingness to pay over time. 
 The data indicated that on average there is a reduction of $0.42 in ticket 
prices with a 10% increase in public finding, thereby running counter to the 
notion from Leeds and von Allmen (2004) that there is no incentive for a profit 
maximizing firm to lower prices if subsidies are increased.  It is possible that 
there are still some important omitted variables, even though the diagnostic tests 
showed otherwise, that would drive down the impact of public funding to near 
zero.  Further, the data indicated that Mikesell (2002) and Crompton, Howard and 
Var (2003) were correct in that teams with a lower percentage of public funding 
shift the burden of these extra fixed costs to the consumer in order to generate 
revenue for their increased fixed costs as compared to teams with higher 
percentages of public funding. 
As the results of this study are counter to economic theory, it is possible 
that a team may charge lower prices as a quid pro quo for the public paying for its 
stadium.  There even might be an implicit agreement between team and city to do 
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so when public funding is arranged.  Fort (2004b) found this to be true in regard 
to operating subsidies.  However, without such an agreement in place, it would be 
assumed that teams would inherently price optimally regardless of fixed costs like 
stadiums. 
Another reason why the results of this study are counter to economic 
theory may be that a team is shifting price increases to concessions, parking, and 
merchandise instead of tickets because the public paid so much for the stadium.  
This move would lessen public relations problems when it is reported that ticket 
prices increased as the team moved into a new publicly funded stadium.  Again 
though, it would be assumed that teams would inherently price optimally 
regardless of fixed costs like stadiums. 
This research has implications for municipalities considering stadium 
projects. New stadium projects are in vogue, especially for cities hoping to 
reinvigorate downtown regions. In 2005, it is estimated that $1.93 billion will be 
spent to construct new sport venues in the United States, with 55% of the costs 
being paid for with public funding (Broughton, 2004).  However, as previous 
research has suggested, the economic impacts of new stadia construction are 
mixed, with some cities seeing promising results and others still hoping for 
positive returns. For municipalities considering funding stadium projects partially 
or fully, this research does support the profit maximizing theory as it applies to 
sports team owners.  Local residents should not expect to have much lower ticket 
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prices if they vote to approve the use of public funds to build a stadium, especially 
if they only vote to approve the partial funding of a stadium.  Average ticket 
prices increased $2.07, or about 5%, each additional season when starting at the 
average ticket price.  Again, it can be assumed that ticket price increases reflect an 
increase in the fan’s willingness to pay over time. 
As the negative impact on ticket price by increase in percent of public 
funding is small, the citizens of a municipality must decide the value of having a 
sports team in town, and if this value outweighs the cost.  When presented to 
taxpayers as a referendum, these tax payers must measure the benefits received, 
their ability to pay, horizontal equity, and vertical equity before agreeing to 
transfer wealth from the masses to franchise shareholders. 
It has been seen that the amount of public funding used has been an issue 
between franchise owners and municipalities over the last 20 years.  When 
citizens decide that there is little or no equity when presented with a new tax 
initiative, franchise owners likely will seek different opportunities to maximize 
profit.  In the mid-1990s, Cleveland refused to publicly fund a new stadium for 
the Browns (football). As a result, Art Modell, the Browns’ owner moved the 
team to Baltimore, where the city pledged to furnish Modell’s team (now the 
Ravens) with a new publicly funded stadium. The same occurred in Charlotte, 
where the community refused to fund a new arena for the Hornets National 
Basketball Association franchise. The Hornets moved to New Orleans, where the 
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promise of a new arena was used to lure the team. In both of these cases, 
ownership sought to improve their ability to generate revenue. Without the burden 
of paying debt obligations on new facilities, both teams are able to earn greater 
profits.   
Furthermore, when a municipality decides to publicly fund a stadium 
project in the NFL, it will eliminate a large portion of the fixed costs of a sport 
franchise.  Franchises may then use the reduction in their fixed expenses to retain 
current players or sign free agents with up-front signing bonuses (Brown, Nagel, 
McEvoy & Rascher, 2004).  The NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement4 
enables teams to circumvent (in the short term) the present year’s salary cap by 
allocating the bonus to future years (National Football League, 1998).   
  Ultimately though, sports franchises are the least affected by stadia 
funding decisions. The cost of building or renovating new stadia will be shifted to 
the consumers, suppliers, and employees, but not ownership groups. 
                                                 
4 During the last six years of the timeframe for this study, the 1998 CBA was in effect. 
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Variable N Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Dev.
Team Code 389 1 16.90745501 32 9.3814728
NFL Season 389 1991 1997.172237 2003 3.7400935
Stadium Capacity 389 41203 69672.66067 92000 8420.31896
Public Funding % 389 0 84.938560 100 28.3939990
Private Funding % 387 0 15.141860 100 28.4481039
Average Ticket Price 389 18.17 39.51 81.89 11.3377113
Fan Cost Index 389 124.68 229.66 438.54 58.6056087
FCI Adjusted for Inflation 389 168.44 260.00 468.59 48.7725123
Stadium Age 389 1 25.213368 82 17.9412910
Percent Capacity Sold 389 0.45 0.8925707 1.03 0.1137622
MSA Population 389 198527 4912434.8 2.15E+07 4930004.91
MSA Per Capita Income 389 21216 31438.298 59693 6285.76974
Season Winning % 389 0.063 0.5010540 0.938 0.1833635
Lagged Winning % 385 0.063 0.5012519 0.938 0.1846927
Expansion Year 389 0.0 0.0102828 1.0 0.1010112
Relocation Year 389 0.0 0.0154242 1.0 0.1233912
Shared MSA 389 0.0 0.1979434 1.0 0.3989624
Lagged Playoff Appearance 389 0.0 0.4010283 1.0 0.4907379
Lagged Superbowl Win 389 0.0 0.0308483 1.0 0.1731293
Lagged Superbowl Appearance 389 0.0 0.0616967 1.0 0.2409136
Table 1
Simple Descriptive Statistics of the NFL Ticket Pricing Model
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Table 2
Regression Results
Dependent Variable Average Ticket Prices
Number of Observations 385
F-statistic 191.7
Prob > F 0.0000
R-squared 0.691
Independent Variable Coefficient t-statistic P > |t|
Constant Term -4104.9 -23.13 0.000
Season 2.069 23.20 0.000
Capacity 0.000044 1.10 0.270
Public Share -0.0415 -2.81 0.005
Stadium Age -0.0455 -2.63 0.009
MSA Income 0.000364 7.55 0.000
Average of Lagged and Current WPCT 6.31 3.08 0.002  
 
 
 
 
 
